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I. INTRODUCTION

It is no exaggeration to describe the relationship between the
European Union and international arbitration as the most dramatic
confrontation between two international legal regimes seen in a great
many years. International law scholars commonly lament the
“fragmentation” of international law, 1 i.e., the co-existence of multiple
+ Please be aware that significant developments have occurred since this Essay was
written. Therefore, this Essay only takes into consideration events occurring through January 1,
2019.
* Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law, Walter Gellhorn Professor of Law, and Director of
the Center for International Commercial and Investment Arbitration (“CICIA”), Columbia Law
School.
1. See MULTI-SOURCED EQUIVALENT NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Tomer Broude
& Yuval Shany eds., 2011); Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple
International Tribunals?, in 271 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: RECUEIL DES COURS 101-382 (1998); C. W. Jenks, Conflict of LawMaking Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 401 (1953); REGIME INTERACTION IN
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international legal regimes whose competences overlap and whose
policies may differ, resulting in a degree of regulatory disorder.
However, seldom do these regimes actually “collide.” By contrast, the
two international regimes in which we are interested this evening—
international arbitration and the European Union—may be described,
without hyperbole, as on a collision course. Arguably, the collision has
already occurred.
The emergence of hostilities on this scale in recent years came
about as something of a surprise to me. At Columbia and elsewhere, I
have taught EU law and international arbitration law concurrently—in
different courses, of course—for more decades than I care to count.
Over that period, I have written and spoken about the EU and
international arbitration as separate and distinct enterprises. 2 Rarely did
teaching, writing or speaking of one necessitate, or even prompt,
discussion of the other.
I. EU LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: “PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE”
For this longstanding pattern, which has now come sharply to an
end, there is one basic explanation. Put simply, neither regime viewed
as within its domain matters that were of most central concern to the
other. At the outset, the European Union’s preoccupations were
construction of the internal market, adoption of a common external
commercial policy (essentially over taxes and tariffs), and development
of certain sectoral policies – agriculture, fisheries, competition law. In
none of these did international arbitration have much of a role to play
or much of a stake. Indeed, in none of these did even the more general
notion of private international law (of which international arbitration
has traditionally been a part) have a serious role to play. Thus, even
when in 1968 the EU Member States entered into an arrangement
harmonizing national laws on the exercise of personal jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION (M. Young ed., 2012); M. Koskenniemi, The
Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1–30
(2007); Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern
Anxieties (2002), 15 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 553-79 (2002).
2. See George A. Bermann, Reconciling European Union Law Demands with the Demands
of International Arbitration, 34 Fordham INT’L L.J. 1193 (2011); George A. Bermann,
Navigating EU Law and the Law of International Arbitration, 28 ARB. INT’L 397, 397–446
(2012).
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matters (“the Brussels Convention”), 3 they were required to do so
entirely outside the framework of the then European Community Law,
and the Brussels Convention itself even went on to include an
“arbitration exception,” the contours of which have never been entirely
clear. 4 Only belatedly, through the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, 5 did
private international law make its way to any measurable degree into
the sphere of European Union law proper.
Conversely, international arbitration concerned itself very little, if
at all, with what mattered most to the European Union. Except in the
case of State-to-State disputes, international arbitration’s diet for years
consisted almost entirely of private contract-based commercial
disputes. European Union law could arise at best tangentially, perhaps
as a defense to a contract claim, and even that did not often occur. What
has happened?
II. THE SOURCES OF TENSION AND THEIR EVOLUTION
The emergence of tensions (one might say hostilities) between the
two international regimes that we are witnessing is widely attributed in
current discourse to the advent of investor-State arbitration, and there
is of course much truth to that perception. Subjecting investor-State
disputes to treaty-based arbitration has represented a quantum shift in
international arbitration’s profile, so much so that, as far as the EU is
concerned, investor-State disputes have practically eclipsed the
international commercial disputes with which international arbitration
has traditionally been associated and which nevertheless still account
for the vast majority of cases that go to arbitration. Investor-State
arbitration is commonly viewed as an altogether different species,
whose most politically salient feature is the unprecedented challenge
that it poses to a State’s right to regulate.
Too often overlooked, in our preoccupation with investor-State
arbitration as a challenge to the European Union and its law, are the
3. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 31.
4. See The Brussels Convention: the Arbitration Exception, 7 ARB. INT’L 179, 179–86
(1991); Filip De Ly, The Interface Between Arbitration And The Brussels Regulation, 5 AM. U.
BUS. L. REV. 485 (2018); B. Audit, Arbitration and the Brussels Convention 9 ARB. INT’L 1, 1–
26 (1993).
5. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C
340) 1.

970

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:3

less salient changes taking place, not on the international arbitration
side, but rather on the EU law side of the equation. Although much less
conspicuous than the advent of investor-State arbitration,
developments in EU law have contributed significantly to the tensions
that have erupted between the European Union and international
arbitration regimes. I suggest that a full appreciation of the scope and
magnitude of these tensions—and any hope for their mitigation—
requires that changes in EU law, however much less dramatic, also be
taken into consideration.
What exactly was that evolution? Three developments have
occurred over the last couple of decades that warrant acknowledgment
in this context. Two of these are relatively circumscribed. Allow me to
quickly develop these two before turning to the third.
A. EU Law as Private and Commercial Law
The first is the EU’s ambitious and intensive campaign to enact
regulations and directives establishing new legal norms in a wide range
of private law commercial relationships—relationships that,
importantly, are the “stuff” of international commercial arbitration. So
great was the volume and range of EU-level legislation in private law
into which the European Union had not previously ventured—product
liability, 6 protection of commercial agents, 7 regulation of legal
practice, 8 cigarette packaging 9—that the European Union finally saw
fit to introduce into EU law a principle of subsidiarity, precisely in an
attempt to stem the tide – a principle that may or may not have had the
desired effect. With this legislation came an increase in rights that
would be asserted not only in national court litigation, but also in
commercial arbitration – and not only in the form of claims, but at least
as often in the form of defenses.
In a second development, the European Union embarked on an
equally vigorous campaign favoring private enforcement of EU
competition law, again both by way of claim and by way of defense,
and again in an arena—private legal relationships, contractual and
otherwise—in which international commercial arbitration traditionally
6. See Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (EC).
7. See Council Directive 86/653, 1986 O.J. (L 382) 17 (EC).
8. See Council Directive 98/5, 1998 O.J. (L 77) 36 (EC); Council Directive 77/249, 1977
O.J. (L 78) 17 (EC).
9. See Council Directive 2014/40/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 127) 1 (EU).
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occupied a portion of center stage. There should never have been any
doubt that violation of EU competition law might operate as a defense
to a contract claim in arbitration, but the European Court of Justice’s
judgment in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV
10 laid any such doubt to rest, while at the same time giving rise to an
assumption that a competition law violation could be invoked not only
by way of a contract defense in arbitration but also by way of a
freestanding claim. 11
What do these two developments have in common and what have
they produced? Of course they brought EU law a much greater salience
in the world of international arbitration, but, importantly for our
purpose, they also prompted the emergence of a powerful notion of
“European Union public policy.” The emergent notion of EU public
policy cast EU law in a new and different light in international
arbitration circles, just as it cast international arbitration in a new and
different light in EU circles—both in ways that may not have been
immediately apparent.
B. European Union Public Policy
The notion of “public policy” is in itself of course nothing new.
Across jurisdictions throughout the world, it denotes values that are
deemed so fundamental to the health, morals and well-being of a social,
political or economic order that they cannot be trumped by word, by
deed, by party agreement, by a choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause
(including an arbitration clause), or even by the application of general
conflict of law principles.
Perhaps not viewing the European Union as quite yet a polity—
and certainly not yet a State—the European Court of Justice had not
been quick to articulate a specific notion of EU public policy. For
decades, the term did not even appear. But with the two EU law
developments I have just mentioned—the enactment of a volume of
legislation in or touching on private law fields and the encouragement
of private enforcement of EU competition law, both matters of strong
public interest—the notion of EU public policy came to the fore. In
retrospect, it should have come as no great surprise that a notion of

10. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. I-3079.
11. See Robert B. Von Mehren, The Eco-Swiss Case and International Arbitration, 19
ARB. INT’L. 465 (2003).
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public policy would eventually emerge on the EU level as well, but that
it did.
The salience of EU public policy in international arbitration first
became apparent in the aforementioned Eco-Swiss case. There, the
Court, while acknowledging that competition law claims and defenses
were arbitrable, announced, much as did the US Supreme Court in the
Mitsubishi case, 12 that arbitral awards in competition law cases were
nevertheless subject to special scrutiny on the merits. 13 If an arbitral
tribunal failed to entertain a competition law claim or defense, a
national court hearing a challenge to the resulting award was
required—as a matter of EU public policy—to annul the resulting
award, even if the competition law claim or defense was inexcusably
never raised during the course of the arbitral proceedings. 14 While EcoSwiss concerned a tribunal’s failure to apply a competition law defense
altogether, it was soon widely understood by Member State courts as
meaning that an award must equally be annulled if, while applying EU
competition law, an arbitral tribunal applied it improperly. 15
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) did not stop with
competition law. It subsequently put claims and defenses based on EU
consumer protection legislation in the same category. 16 Once again,
tribunals were required to entertain these claims and defenses, and do
so decently, even if neither party raised them in the course of the
arbitral proceedings, and if they did not, annulment of the award would
follow. 17
There is of course nothing fundamentally antithetical between
international arbitration and public policy. As we all know, the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards makes violation of public policy a ground for refusing
to recognize or enforce a foreign arbitral award, 18 and a ground that
courts may, and arguably should, address, if necessary on their own
12. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
13. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd, supra note 10, ¶ 40.
14. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd, supra note 10, ¶ 41.
15. Christoph Liebscher, EU Member State Court Application of Eco Swiss: Review of the
Case Law and Future Prospects, in EU AND US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK FOR
PRACTITIONERS 785-827 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt eds., 2011).
16. Bernd Ulrich Graf & Arthur E. Appleton, Elisa Marioa Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil
Milenium: EU Consumer Law as a Defence against Arbitral Awards, 25 ASA BULL. 28 (2007).
17. C-168/05, Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL, 2006 E.C.R. I-10421.
18. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art.
V(2)(b), June 10, 1958, 21.3 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
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motion. The UN Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) Model Law follows suit in connection with set aside
actions, making violation of public policy a basis for the set aside of an
award,19 if necessary at the instance of a court acting sua sponte. In
sum, the international arbitration regime acknowledges the paramount
role of public policy and gives it full effect.
It is surely not the case that all of a jurisdiction’s legal norms rise
to the level of public policy—only those that are, as commonly said,
truly fundamental to the health, morals and well-being of a social,
political or economic order. In principle, public policy encompasses
only an exceedingly small subset of exceptionally fundamental norms
within a given legal order.
In fact, the same considerations that led the ECJ to view
competition law and consumer protection law norms as having public
policy status may well lead it to consider any number of other domains
as sharing that status. There is no obvious stopping point. Equally
worrisome is the question of the standard of judgment by which a
reviewing court determines the correctness or adequacy of an arbitral
tribunal’s treatment of a competition law or consumer protection law
claim or defense, or other claim or defense deemed to embody EU
public policy. While most national courts suggested, in the wake of
Eco-Swiss, that such review should be highly deferential, 20 permitting
annulment only where the error that a tribunal made was “flagrant,” the
Advocate-General of the ECJ actually argued that a national court’s
substantive review of an award on a matter of EU public policy should
be nothing less than de novo. 21
The prospect of full judicial review on the merits of arbitral
awards in these fields was understandably met in the international
arbitration community with some alarm. It was also met with some
concern in Member State courts which all, in varying degrees,
considered support for international arbitration, including the finality
of awards, to be an important public policy of their own, even if not
one for the European Union.

19. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration with amendments
as adopted in 2006, art. 17 I (1)(b)(2), December 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1302.
20. Christoph Liebscher, Chapter 23: EU Member State Court Application of Eco Swiss:
Review of the Case Law and Future Prospects, in EU AND US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION: A
HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 785 (G. Blanke & P. Landolt eds., 2011).
21. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd, supra note 10.
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Thus far, I have identified two discrete and relatively recent
developments in European Union law that combined to produce an
expansive and highly robust conception of EU public policy—one that
could not help but pose a serious challenge to the international
arbitration legal order.
C. “EU Law Autonomy” and its Meaning
But I referred to there being a third major development in EU law
that has been brewing for a while and likewise represents a serious,
perhaps even more serious, challenge to international arbitration. I
refer, and it will come as no surprise, to the notion of the “autonomy”
of EU law and the EU legal order. This, notion, like the notion of EU
public policy, is not entirely new but, again like EU public policy, has
recently achieved unprecedented resonance.
Autonomy of EU law initially arose in a context quite unlike the
context we find ourselves in today. In its landmark judgment in NV
Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend v.
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, the ECJ proclaimed the
EU to be “a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which
the States have limited their sovereign rights.” 22 In Costa v. ENEL, the
Court continued in the following vein: “By contrast with ordinary
international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system”
that the Member States and their courts are bound to respect. 23 The
Treaty Establishing the European Community (“TEC”), the Court
posited, constituted “an independent source of law.” 24 The Court did
not refer specifically in these or other early judgments to the
“autonomy” of EU law, but that is clearly what it meant.
It is one thing for the ECJ to posit the autonomy of EU law vis-àvis the law of its constituent parts. The US Supreme Court has
essentially said the same thing in describing the relationship between
federal and state law within the United States.25 The autonomy posited
in van Gend en Loos and Costa was an autonomy internal to the EU
itself.

22. Case C-26/62, NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos
v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 1963 E.C.R. 1, ¶ 12.
23. Case C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, ¶ 593.
24. Id. at ¶ 594.
25. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
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But it is quite a leap to go from the autonomy of EU law vis-à-vis
the EU Member States to autonomy of EU law from the world’s other
legal orders. The notion of EU law’s autonomy specifically on the
international law plane surfaced in recent decades chiefly from a series
of opinions rendered by the ECJ in reply to questions by the European
Commission on whether the EU’s entry into a given international treaty
would be compatible with the EU’s constitutive treaties. By way of
example, in Opinion 2/13 on the conformity with EU law of the EU’s
prospective accession to the European Human Rights Convention, the
Court reaffirmed what it had said in connection with the prospect of
EU accession to other international treaties, namely that the EU could
accede to a treaty providing for a court that would be responsible for
interpreting that treaty and whose decisions would bind the EU
institutions, including the Court of Justice – but that those decisions
could have “no adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU legal
order,” 26 meaning such a court “must not have the effect of binding the
EU and its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a
particular interpretation of the rules of EU law.” 27 For the ECJ to
reserve to itself sole power to render authoritative interpretation of EU
law is not in itself remarkable. I think most if not all national supreme
courts assert sole power to render authoritative interpretation of
national law. But the ECJ went further than that in at least two
important respects.
First, the Court in these opinions reserved to itself not only the
power to interpret EU law authoritatively, but the power to interpret
EU law altogether. In Opinion 2/13 and on similar occasions, the Court
asserted a monopoly over the interpretation of EU law altogether,
authoritative or not. This is shown by the Court’s repeated assertion
that it cannot subject itself to the jurisdiction of an international court
or tribunal if that body, as is invariably the case, is incapable as a matter
of EU law of making preliminary references to the ECJ for authoritative
interpretations of EU law when the need for interpretation arises. 28 The
preliminary reference mechanism, said the Court, is “the keystone of
the judicial system established by the Treaties.” 29 For that reason alone,
26. Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms—Compatibility of the draft agreement
with the EU and FEU Treaties, EU:C:2014:2454, ¶ 183 [hereinafter Opinion 2/13].
27. Id. at ¶ 184.
28. Id.
29. Id. at ¶ 198.
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said the Court, accession of the EU to the ECHR would be “liable
adversely to affect the specific characteristics of EU law and its
autonomy.” 30
I personally know of no legal system that purports to disallow
foreign courts from interpreting and applying that legal system’s law
in cases properly before them. Legal systems do not generally object to
their law being given effect in courts of other jurisdictions. But to be
more precise by way of example, what is a court or tribunal created
under a bilateral or multilateral investment agreement to which the
European Union is a Party to do when there arises, in a dispute that
comes before it, a question of the interpretation or application of EU
law? Advocate-General Wathelet argued in his Opinion in Slowakische
Republik v Achmea BV that an investor-State tribunal sitting on the
territory of an EU Member State qualifies as a Member State court or
tribunal, within the meaning of the EU’s preliminary reference
mechanism, and has standing to make preliminary references to the
ECJ.31 However, the Court in its Achmea judgment squarely rejected
that proposition. 32
D. Opinion 2/13, Achmea, and Micula
The question whether EU law autonomy bars an international
court or tribunal from interpreting and applying EU law will take center
stage in what is to be the ECJ’s Opinion 1/17 on the compatibility with
EU law of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (“CETA”). 33 At the hearing in that case on June 28, 2018,
Belgium and Slovenia in particular questioned whether the dispute
resolution system under CETA complies with the principle that the ECJ
has exclusive jurisdiction to interpret EU law, precisely because
tribunal established under CETA would not be in a position to refer
questions of EU law to the Court. 34

30. Id. at ¶ 200.
31. Case C-284/16, Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV, 2018 ECLI:EU:C:2018:158,
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=194583&page
Index=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=14061059 [https://perma.cc/
GQK9-C54N].
32. Id. at ¶ 57, ¶¶ 45-49.
33. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can-EU, Oct. 30, 2016.
34. Opinion 1/17 on CETA: Hearing Report, INT’L LITIG. BLOG (July 3, 2018),
http://international-litigation-blog.com/opinion-1-17-ceta-hearing-report/
[https://perma.cc/
LF82-4TYU]
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Happily, the Commission and other Member States have argued
in connection with Opinion 1/17 that the principle of autonomy of EU
law necessarily has different implications in extra-EU situations as
compared to intra-EU situations. 35 While one hopes that to be the case,
one simply does not know exactly what the autonomy of EU law
signifies in the application of international treaties to which the EU is
a Party. Will it help that, under CETA Article 8.31, a tribunal “may
consider, as appropriate, the domestic law of a Party as a matter of fact”
or that it “shall follow the prevailing interpretation given to the
domestic law by the courts or authorities of that Party and any meaning
given to domestic law by the Tribunal shall not be binding upon the
courts or the authorities of that Party”? 36 Is a CETA tribunal a court,
rather than an arbitral tribunal and will that make any difference so far
as the effect of its rulings on EU law is concerned? We do not know
the answers to these and other questions, and Opinion 1/17, as issued,
may well not answer them.
Second, and this is quite important, the ECJ did not limit itself in
Opinion 2/13, or other such opinions, to asserting an interpretive
monopoly over EU law. It asserted exclusive authority not only to
determine the meaning of EU law, but also the validity of EU law. 37
“Jurisdiction to carry out a judicial review of acts, actions or omissions
on the part of the EU, including in the light of fundamental rights,” it
declared, “cannot be conferred exclusively on an international court
which is outside the institutional and judicial framework of the EU.”38
To be sure, the Court in Achmea was at pains to distinguish between
the intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (“BIT”) at issue in that case,
on the one hand, and the EU’s own investment agreements, such as
CETA, on the other. As for the latter, the Court reiterated what it had
said in numerous opinions, namely that “the competence of the EU in
the field of international relations and its capacity to conclude
international agreements necessarily entail the power to submit to the
decisions of a court which is created or designated by such agreements

35. Id.
36. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one
part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, 2017 O.J. (L 11/23).
37. Opinion 2/13, ¶ 257.
38. Opinion 2/13, ¶ 257 (citing Opinion 1/09, Creation of a unified patent litigation system
– European and Community Patents Court – Compatibility of the draft agreement with the
Treaties, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, ¶¶ 78, 80, 89).
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as regards the interpretation and application of their provisions,” 39 but
it attached the following provocative proviso: “provided that the
autonomy of the EU and its legal order is respected.” 40
This proviso, which is found in numerous ECJ Opinions41
declaring the EU’s accession to an international agreement to be
incompatible with the autonomy of EU law, is to be taken seriously. As
the EU becomes more and more an actor on the international stage –
particularly in international investment law – the need to “unpack” the
meaning of EU law “autonomy” is becoming increasingly urgent. What
exactly does it mean?
We know for certain that the notion of EU law autonomy is meant
to have jurisdictional consequences. Strictly speaking, Achmea was a
jurisdictional ruling only, and we can hope that, as the Commission
appears to have conceded at the hearing in Opinion 1/17, the proviso
just quoted will not call into question the authority of CETA and other
tribunals to interpret and apply EU law.
Achmea was not a substantive law ruling, and accordingly did not
inquire into the authority of BIT tribunals, or any tribunal, to determine
the validity of EU law instruments in cases that come before them. One
can only hope that EU law public policy will not get in the way of the
authority of CETA tribunals, and tribunals constituted under other
investment treaties to which the EU is a party, to perform substantive
review of EU law measures and eventually condemn them if
condemnation is indeed warranted. I like to read the Commission’s own
intervention in Opinion 1/17 as offering assurances to that effect.
But the very question brings us back to the matter of EU public
policy on which I spent considerable time earlier in this Essay. And it
brings me to a specific case that the storm surrounding Achmea has
practically eclipsed: Micula v. Romania. 42 Like Achmea, Micula was
an intra-EU dispute in which the Commission raised its usual challenge
to arbitral jurisdiction. 43 But Micula represented more than a
jurisdictional challenge by the European Union to the international
39. Opinion 1/09, Creation of a unified patent litigation system – European and
Community Patents Court – Compatibility of the draft agreement with the Treaties,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, ¶ 74.
40. Case C-284/16, Slowakische Republik, supra note 31, ¶ 57.
41. Proposed agreement between the European Community and non-Member States on
the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, 2002 O.J. (L 285) ¶¶ 21,23, and 26.
42. Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L.and S.C.
Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, (Dec. 11, 2013).
43. Id.
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arbitration regime; it represented a substantive challenge as well. In that
case, the European Commission argued that the investment tribunal, to
which the Micula’s resorted pursuant to the Swedish-Romanian BIT
when Romania withdrew its grant of state aid, could not properly
condemn Romania for having done so, since the aid was illegal under
EU law and Romania was obligated under EU law to withdraw it.44
When the tribunal nevertheless issued an award against Romania for
violating its treaty obligation of fair and equitable treatment and
condemned it to pay damages, 45 the Commission forbade Romania to
pay on the ground that any such payment would in itself constitute an
illegal state aid. 46
If, in the eyes of the EU institutions, EU public policy operates as
a defense to what would otherwise be an intra-EU BIT violation for
which Romania would be liable, might it also operate as a defense to
what would otherwise be a treaty violation under CETA (or other new
Free Trade Agreements) for which the EU itself might be liable? Even
if it does not operate as a defense (as indeed it should not), might an
EU Member State court nevertheless be compelled under EU law to
deny such an award recognition or enforcement on EU public policy
grounds?
The role of EU public policy under investment agreements like
CETA may well depend on the nature of the tribunals that those
agreements establish. It is to this day regrettably unclear whether those
tribunals are to be understood as arbitral tribunals or as courts; whether
their rulings are to be understood as international arbitral awards or as
international court judgments; and whether those ruling can or cannot
be denied effect in the European Union theatre on EU public policy
grounds.
III. RECALIBRATION AS REMEDY
It is no secret that the international arbitration world, and the
international investment arbitration world in particular, is caught up
these days in serious soul-searching. It is entirely too early to tell what
shape investor-State dispute resolution will take after this period of
introspection comes to an end. But whatever the reform that ultimately
44. Commission Decision 2015/1470, 2015 O.J. (L. 232/43).
45. Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L.and S.C.
Multipack S.R.L., supra note 42.
46. Commission Decision 2015/1470, supra note 44.
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emerges (and it is difficult to imagine that there will not be reform of
some kind), the fact remains that the international arbitration
community will have reexamined some of its most basic
understandings. Whether or not the EU ends up with the multilateral
investment court of the sort it has been championing, it is likely to view
current reform efforts within the international arbitration community as
having helped the EU law—international arbitration law interface to
take a turn for the better.
How much room, if any, we well may ask, is there for the
European Union, conversely, to relax in turn the demands it has made
on international arbitration. Opportunities are there. Do the contours of
European public policy, as a ground for challenging arbitral
determination—whether in competition law, consumer protection law,
or any other public policy field—stand to be more clearly delineated
and cabined than they have been? Might, somehow, the notion of EU
law autonomy, in whatever manifestations it may take, likewise be
reined in? Might the EU relax its asserted monopoly over the
interpretation and application of EU law? Might the EU clarify whether
its compliance with the rulings of the tribunals established under the
EU’s own investment treaties, however those rulings might be
denominated, are or are not subject to defeasance by EU public policy.
In short, some recalibration on the EU side of the EU-international
arbitration equation is to my mind in order, just as some recalibration
on the international arbitration side has been. Given the EU’s positively
central role in shaping today’s international legal order, the efforts it
might make in this direction stand to do a world of good.

